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ARTICLE 
KEEP IT AND REFORM IT 
By: Tyler Yeargain1
I. INTRODUCTION 
Starting in the 1930s, Maryland no longer required that state 
legislative vacancies be filled by special elections, as most states did at the 
time. Instead, the state provided that legislative vacancies would be filled by 
gubernatorial appointments. Following several additional constitutional 
amendments, this system has changed over time, but has largely remained in 
body responsible for filling the vacancy, with the governor operating as a de
facto rubber stamp. Most of the time, this process has quietly operated in the 
background, churning out replacement legislators as necessary, attracting 
little attention in the process. 
e pushed in 
recent years to instead require special elections,2 the push has intensified in 
the last year following the nomination of Chanel Branch to fill a State House 
seat. Branch, the daughter of House Majority Whip Talmage Branch, was 
narrowly elected by the Democratic Central Committee for the 45th 
Legislative District to fill the vacancy left by State Delegate Cheryl Glenn, 
who was charged with bribery and wire fraud.3
mired by allegations of nepotism, was made worse by the fact that she sat on 
the central committee in charge of filling the vacancy and cast the deciding 
vote for herself, 4  and that reporters were removed from the central 
5 Despite the controversy, however, Governor Larry 
1 Associate Director, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy. 
2 See, e.g., Len Lazarick, Delegates Want Voters to Fill Vacancies in Legislature, But GOP 
Wants to Keep Party Role, MARYLANDREPORTER.COM (Jan. 30, 2015), 
https://marylandreporter.com/2015/01/30/delegates-want-voters-to-fill-vacancies-in-
legislature-but-gop-wants-to-keep-party-role/. 
3 Talia Richman, Chanel Branch Nominated to Replace Baltimore Del. Cheryl Glenn in 




5 Fern Shen, Reporter Booted Out of Meeting Where Chanel Branch Is Voted in, BALT.
BREW (Jan. 14, 2020, 8:02 AM), https://www.baltimorebrew.com/2020/01/14/reporter-
booted-out-of-meeting-where-chanel-branch-is-voted-in/. 
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Hogan ended up appointing her, and she will hold the seat until the 2022 
election.6
 The response from lawmakers was swift. State Comptroller Peter 
Franchot, a candidate for Governor in 2022, called for the state to bring back 
special elections. 7  State Delegate David Moon, who had previously 
introduced a constitutional amendment in 2015, again pushed for an 
amendment to change the way that the state fills legislative vacancies. 8
mirroring Fra
opposition.9 His current proposal is to preserve the appointment process, but 
to have the appointee only serve until the next general election which, for 
Branch, would have been 2020.10
 At 
by men in smoke-filled back rooms and therefore worthy of a massive 
overhaul. But the simplicity of that conclusion belies its accuracy. Special 
always low-turnout affairs held at strange times of the year that ultimately 
deprive communities of representation for the vast majority of legislative 
conscientious decision by Progressive Era reformers to push for accurate, 
consistent representation and to avoid unnecessary and frequent elections. 
ubtedly in need of reform, it should be 
reformed not scrapped. 
 This Article proceeds in three parts. First, in Part I, it explains how 
he post-Revolutionary Era and 
continuing to the twenty-first century. Then, Part II argues that appointment 
systems are inherently preferable to and are more democratic than special 
6 Talia Richman, Gov. Hogan Appoints Chanel Branch of Baltimore to Replace Cheryl 
Glenn in Maryland House, BALT. SUN (Jan. 28, 2020, 4:10 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-pol-chanel-branch-20200127-
5eplz5frqnfktplgwpein2jnoe-story.html; see MD. CONST. art. III, § 13 (1936). 
7 Peter Franchot (@peterfranchot), TWITTER (Jan. 14, 2020, 6:21 PM), https://twitter.com/
peterfranchot/status/1217270535236792323 
the secretive elections that are decided by a handful of votes and violate every recognized 
principle of democracy. I will happily support legislation to hold special elections when 
8 Talia Richman, Maryland Legislators Target Process for Filling General Assembly 






elections because they maximize accuracy and immediacy in representation. 
Finally, Part III outlines the changes that can, and should, be made to the 
system that will allow it to better reflect the goals of all legislative 
appointment systems. 
I. MARYLAND S CURRENT SYSTEM
provided for a bicameral 
legislature, each chamber having different election procedures and different 
mechanisms for filling vacancies. The House of Delegates was popularly 
elected, with vacancies filled by special elections called by the House 
Speaker. 11  The Senate was indirectly elected, by an electoral college 
composed of county-level electors,12 and vacancies were filled by the Senate 
itself.13
tion process served as an inspiration 
for the indirect election of U.S. Senators in the federal constitution, evidenced 
by the contemporaneous accounts of the Framers,14 and for the use of the 
Electoral College to select the President.15 Similarly, when Kentucky was 
admitted as a state in 1792, its first constitution provided for nearly identical 
procedures for electing state senators and filling senate vacancies.16
it quickly broke down. Though one-person-one-vote was a concept that 
11 MD. CONST. art. II (1776). 
12 See id. arts. XIV, XV. 
13 See id. art. XIX. 
14 Federalist NO. The constitution of Maryland furnishes the 
most apposite example. The Senate of that State is elected, as the federal Senate will be, 
indirectly by the people, and for a term less by one year only than the federal Senate. It is 
distinguished, also, by the remarkable prerogative of filling up its own vacancies within the 
term of its appointment, and, at the same time, is not under the control of any such rotation 
as is provided for the federal Senate. There are some other lesser distinctions, which would 
expose the former to colorable objections, that do not lie against the latter. If the federal 
Senate, therefore, really contained the danger which has been so loudly proclaimed, some 
symptoms at least of a like danger ought by this time to have been betrayed by the Senate of 
Maryland, but no such symptoms have appeared. On the contrary, the jealousies at first 
entertained by men of the same description with those who view with terror the 
correspondent part of the federal Constitution, have been gradually extinguished by the 
progress of the experiment; and the Maryland constitution is daily deriving, from the 
salutary operation of this part of it, a reputation in which it will probably not be rivalled by 
that of any State in the Union. see also A. Clarke Hagensick, Revolution or Reform in 
1836: Maryland’s Preface to the Dorr Rebellion, 57 MD. HIST. MAG. 346, 347 (1962). 
15 John D. Feerick, The Electoral College: Why It Was Created, 54 A.B.A. J. 249, 252 n.34 
(1968); Hagensick, supra note 14, at 347. 
16 KY. CONST. art. I, §§ 10, 12 (1792). 
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-based 
electoral college necessarily meant that some votes counted more than others. 
Indeed, it was possible to win the statewide popular vote for state senate 
electors but to fail to win a majority on the electoral college itself. And being 
devastating. The electoral college picked every member of the state senate by 
majority vote, meaning that a one-vote majority on the electoral college for 
one political party usually meant a unanimous slate of senators for that party.17
Moreover, the general assembly elected the governor, meaning that the 
18
And to compound matters, the vacancy-filling procedure was effectively used 
to alter the composition of the senate altogether in one term, all but one of 
the state senators had 
elected by the electoral college.19
 In the 1836 elections, the Democrats won 53% of the statewide 
popular vote for senate electors but ended up with only 19 electors to the Whig 
20 Hoping to use public pressure to force a more equitable senate 
composition, the Democratic electors refused to convene, depriving the 
electoral college of a quorum.21 Their position eroded, however, the following 
month in the State House elections, when Whigs won a commanding majority, 
and the Democratic electors allowed the electoral college to convene, which 
in turn elected a unanimous Whig Senate.22 But the new general assembly, 
though dominated by Whigs, was sympathetic to the process arguments raised 
by the Democrats. The assembly pushed for transformative constitutional 
changes, which included making the Governor and State Senate popularly 
elected and requiring special elections to fill senate vacancies.23
 This system remained in place for almost a century. But in 1935, the 
Maryland general assembly decided to switch gears.24 Beginning two decades 
prior, a handful of states began amending their constitutions and statutes to 
17 Hagensick, supra note 14, at 347 48. However, in 1826, after the National Republicans 
won a majority on the senate electoral college based, in part, on their pledge to appoint a 
bipartisan senate, the Senate was composed of eleven National Republicans and four 
Federalists. It was the only time that the Senate was not unanimously controlled by one 
party. Tyler Yeargain, The Legal History of State Legislative Vacancies and Temporary 
Appointments, 28 J.L. & POL Y 564, 578 n.69 (2020). 
18 MD. CONST. art. XXV (1776). 
19 Hagensick, supra note 14, at 347 48. 
20 Id. at 350. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 353 56. 
23 MD. CONST. art. III, §§ 6 (amended 1837); HERBERT CHARLES SMITH & JOHN T. WILLIS,
MARYLAND POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT: DEMOCRATIC DOMINANCE 137 38 (2012); 
Hagensick, supra note 14, at 357. 
24 Yeargain, supra note 18, at, 592 93. 
2020] 5
fill legislative vacancies, at least some of the time, through temporary 
appointments. 25  Many of these appointment procedures had same-party 
requirements that is, whomever was granted the power of appointment, be 
it the governor, county commission, or even local party officials, was required 
to fill the vacancy with someone of the same party as the previous 
incumbent.26  These changes, firmly rooted in the Progressive movement, 
were adopted with the same vein of thought as the Seventeenth Amendment, 
the short-ballot movement, unicameralism, proportional representation, and 
the Model State Constitution.27
 The Maryland constitutional amendment that was drafted by the 
general assembly in 1935, and approved by the voters in 1936, provided for a 
same-party appointment system.28 When a vacancy occurred, the state party 
draft a list of nominees, one of whom would be selected to fill the seat by the 
Governor.29 Subsequent amendments in 1966, 1978, and 1986 made small 
changes to this provision, but largely kept it intact.30 The 1966 amendment 
transferred the power from the state party to its county-level central 
committees,31 the 1978 amendment clarified what would occur if there was 
no central committee to draft a list of nominees,32 and the 1986 amendment 
33
 The procedure is relatively simple. If a legislator vacates their seat, the 
county-level central committees nominate a replacement, who is then 
appointed by the governor and serves out the remainder of the term.34 Though 
the constitution implies that the committees are only meant to nominate one
name, the state attorney general has clarified that if they nominate more than 
one name, the governor must pick one of the two.35 If the district includes 
25 Id. at 588-89, 591. 
26 Id. at 589-93. 
27 Id. at 588-89, 593. 
28 MD. CONST. art. III, § 13 (1936). 
29 Id. 
30 DAN FRIEDMAN, THE MARYLAND STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 139-40
(2011). 
31 MD. CONST. art. III, § 13 (1967). 
32 MD. CONST. art. III, § 13 (1979). 
33 MD. CONST. art. III, § 13 (amended 1987). 
34 Id. 
35 Friedman, supra  Gen. 241 (Oct. 19, 1977)). 
Governor shall appoint a person to fill such vacancy from a person whose name shall be 
MD. CONST. art. III, § 13. 
sentence a
appoint a person to fill such vacancy from ccount how other states fill 
     
          6                     University of Baltimore Law Forum                 [Vol. 51.1 
more than one county, the central committees from each county cast one vote 
in favor of a nominee
for selection.36 And if the previous legislator was elected as an independent 
or as a member of a minor party without a central committee, the governor 
political party, if any, as that of the vacat 37
happens if the Governor refuses to select the single name submitted to him? 
Other states, like Kansas and North Carolina, make it clear that the nominee 
is seated anyway,38
hypothetical question. Though Governor Hogan ended up appointing Chanel 
Branch to fill the vacancy discussed earlier,39 some groups urged him not to.40
His public effusiveness about Branch notwithstanding, 41  he may well 
privately concluded that, despite an
worth triggering a small constitutional crisis (especially one with no obvious 
resolution) and upsetting two members of a politically connected family in 
the process. But even though the Governor opted against declining to appoint 
this
another, similar scenario could present itself in the future especially when 
II. THE MERITS OF LEGISLATIVE APPOINTMENT SYSTEMS
legislative vacancies through same-party appointments, both interpretations have points in 
their favor. 
36 Id.; Friedman, supra note 30 at 94. 
37 MD. CONST. art. III, § 13(a)(3). 
38 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-
appoint any person as required by this subsection after receiving a lawfully executed 
certificate hereunder, such person shall be deemed to have been so appointed 
notwithstanding such N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-
make the appointment within the required period, he shall be presumed to have made the 
appointment and the legislative body to which the appointee was recommended is directed 
to seat the appointee as a member in good standing for the duration of the unexpired 
39 Press Release, Office of Governor Larry Hogan, Governor Hogan Appoints Chanel 
Branch to the Maryland House of Delegates (Jan. 27, 2020), https://governor.maryland.gov/
2020/01/27/governor-hogan-appoints-chanel-branch-to-the-maryland-house-of-delegates/; 
see also Richman, supra note 6.  
40 Richman, supra note 6. 
41 Press Release, supra note 40 I am confident that Chanel Branch will represent the 
citizens of Baltimore City admirably in her new role as state delegate,  said Governor 
Hogan. I offer Ms. Branch my sincere congratulations and look forward to working with 
her during this legislative session.
2020] 7
 It may seem counterintuitive to argue that legislative appointment 
systems are more protective of the right to vote than actual elections where 
actual voters vote. But they are, as this Part argues. One of the best measures 
of the strength of a country
an election match the intent of the voters. Admittedly, there is no federal 
constitutional requirement that all election results match voter intent a
s recent abstention in 
Rucho v. Common Cause, when it dismissed partisan gerrymandering as a 
non- 42
human rights agreements generally frame the right to democratic governance 
as results matching intent,43
exercise of individual rights of equal participation in the political process and 
an outcome of a political process that allows a relatively full, free, and equal 
participation  the ag 44
Moreover, landmark Supreme Court cases involving the application 
of one-person-one-vote, like Gray v. Sanders and Reynolds v. Sims, have 
effectively mandated that results match intent, insofar as they require the 
winner of the popular vote to be the winner of the election.45 Obviously, 
42 See generally Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
43 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21, § 3, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, U.N. Doc. 
shall be the basis of the authority 
of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be 
by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting 
from voter intent. 
44 Jordan J. Paust, The Human Right to Participate in Armed Revolution and Related Forms 
of Social Violence: Testing the Limits of Permissibility, 32 EMORY L.J. 545, 566 (1983); see
also Steven Wheatley, Democracy in International Law: A European Perspective, 51 INT L
& COMPARATIVE L.Q. 
in the phraseology of the American Convention on Human Rights (1969), is that they must 
Ludsin, Returning Sovereignty to the People, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT L L. 97, 146 (2013) 
exp
45 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964) Overweighting and overvaluation of 
the votes of those living here has the certain effect of dilution and undervaluation of the 
votes of those living there. The resulting discrimination against those individual voters 
living in disfavored areas is easily demonstrable mathematically. Their right to vote is 
simply not the same right to vote as that of those living in a favored part of the State. Two, 
five, or 10 of them must vote before the effect of their voting is equivalent to that of their 
favored neighbor.
recognized that all qualified vote
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beyond just the impact of gerrymandering, the continued presence of the 
Electoral College and the undemocratic nature of the U.S. Senate all-too-
frequently means that election results don’t
Fourteenth Amendment for that reason if they were implemented at the state 
-person-one-vote 
requirements.46
So, if the goal of an election outcome is for it to match the intent of 
the voters, same-party legislative appointment systems do a substantially 
better job than special elections. On a practical level, appointment systems 
capture the most important parts of representation: partisan affiliation and 
47 -splitting 
rights must be recognized in any preliminary election that in fact determines the true weight 
a vote will have. The concept of political equality in the voting booth contained in the 
Fifteenth Amendment extends to all phases of state elections . . . once the class of voters is 
chosen and their qualifications specified, we see no constitutional way by which equality of 
see also; Gordon E. Baker, One Man, One Vote, and 
“Political Fairness”—Or, How the Burger Court Found Happiness by Rediscovering 
Reynolds v. Sims, 23 EMORY L.J. 701, 707 (1974) ) 
The Warren Court Crusade for the Holy 
Grail of “One Man-One Vote”, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 219, 268-69 (1969) (discussing the goal 
46 See, e.g., Sims -called federal analogy is inapplicable as a 
Sanders
inclusion of the electoral college in the Constitution, as the result of specific historical 
concerns, validated the collegiate principle despite its inherent numerical inequality, but 
Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise of One Person, One Vote, 102 MICH. L. REV. 213, 
-person-one-
Senate); James Shinn Graham, Note, One Person-One Vote: The Presidential Primaries 
and Other National Convention Delegate Selection Processes, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 257, 268 
(1972
escapes scrutiny under one person-
Artificial Unit Voting and the Electoral College, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2421, 2433 36 (1992) 
 the state 
level). MSNBC host Chris Hayes made a similar point more recently, see All in with Chris 
Hayes
tion for the 
historians for it. See, e.g., Jay Cost, Chris Hayes and Progressives’ Lack of Respect for the 
Constitution, NAT L REV. (Sept. 3, 2019, 3:38 PM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/09/chris-hayes-and-progressives-lack-of-respect-for-
the-constitution/. 
47 E.g., Paul H. Rubin, Vote for the Party, Not the Person, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2008, 
12:01 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122506895498170731. 
2020] 9
increased by some measures in the 1980s and 1990s, it unequivocally started 
decreasing by the early 2000s,48
virtually nonexistent.49
important factors, if not the single most important factor, in models of voting 
and ideology in all elections even in ostensibly nonpartisan ones.50
All of this is to say that same-party legislative appointment procedures 
guarantee, with near-total accuracy, that most voters will be accurately 
represented in the ways that matter most following a state legislative vacancy. 
If voters voted for a Democrat in the last regularly scheduled general election, 
they will continue to be represented by a Democrat in the legislature
regardless of whether the specific person for whom they voted lives, dies, or 
is elected to another office. It is unlikely that the replacement will differ from 
her predecessor ideologically, 51  though it may be the case that party 
improbable that a party committee would select a replacement legislator that 
as ideologically incompatible.52 Little data exists on this question, but that 
which does suggests that party-selected legislative replacements are actually 
48 David C. Kimball, A Decline in Ticket Splitting and the Increasing Salience of Party 
Labels, in MODELS OF VOTING IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: THE 2000 U.S. ELECTION 161,
161 (Herbert F. Weisberg & Clyde Wilcox eds., 2004). 
49 E.g., Drew Desilver, Split-Ticket Districts, Once Common, Are Now Rare, PEW RES. CTR.
(Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/08/08/split-ticket-districts-
once-common-are-now-rare/; Geoffrey Skelley, Split-Ticket Voting Hit a New Low in 2018 
Senate and Governor Races, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 19, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/split-ticket-voting-hit-a-new-low-in-2018-senate-and-
governor-races/. 
50 E.g., Chris W. Bonneau & Damon M. Cann, Party Identification and Vote Choice in 
Partisan and Nonpartisan Elections, 37 POLITICAL BEHAV. 43, 44, 61 62 (2015). 
51 See Seth Masket & Boris Shor, Primary Electores vs. Party Elites: Who are the 
Polarizers? (May 8, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author (concluding that 
there is no ideological difference between elected and appointed legislators in Colorado and 
District was filled. The incumbent, Jerry Costello II, a conservative Democrat, was 
replace him. Joseph Bustos, New State Rep. Nathan Reitz Will Be a Pivotal Vote on the 
Graduated Income Tax, BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT (May 24, 2019, 10:38 AM), 
https://www.bnd.com/news/local/article230748774.html. Reitz ended up supporting a 
graduated income tax, which Costello had opposed, triggering allegations from the state 
Republican Party that Reitz was appointed to replace Costello in a 
Illinois Moves Closer to Graduated Income Tax, WSIL TV NEWS (May 28, 
2019, 1:17 AM), https://wsiltv.com/2019/05/28/illinois-moves-closer-to-graduated-income-
tax/; Bustos, supra.
52 See generally Masket & Shor, supra note 47 at 61-62. 
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likelier to be re-elected than voter-selected candidates.53 This conclusion is 
true even when controlling for uncontested elections and even when 
comparing elected and appointed first-term legislators seeking re-election.54
Special elections, meanwhile, are likelier to have results inconsistent 
established period of time,55 which places them at bizarre and seemingly 
random times during the year. Some states have moved to consolidate 
elections, to provide more predictability as to when elections occur,56 but 
these states are far in the minority. Instead, in most cases, special elections 
are scheduled for otherwise-random Tuesdays.57 This randomness can be 
exacerbated by scheduling special elections for days of the week other than 
Tuesday, as governors in several Midwestern states have done in the past few 
years.58
53 See generally Seth E. Masket, Do Voters and Insiders Nominate the Same Sort of 
Candidates? A Look at Legislative Vacancy Appointments in Illinois and Colorado, in
Presentation at the UCLA Department of Political Science (May 11, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). But see Keith Hamm & David M. Olson, Midsession 
Vacancies: Why Do State Legislators Exit and How Are They Replaced?, in CHANGING 
PATTERNS IN STATE LEGISLATIVE CAREERS 127, 144 45 (Gary F. Moncrief & Joel A. 
Thompson eds., 1992)  (noting that, based on 1981
office by special election are somewhat more likely to be able to retain the seats than if they 
preferable here, 
because it was a twenty-year dataset with newer data and specifically excluded uncontested 
54 Masket, supra note 53, at 8 9. 
55 See, e.g., MD. ELECTION LAW CODE ANN. § 8-710 (relating to special congressional 
elections). 
56 E.g., Connor Phillips, The Effect of Election Consolidation on Turnout, MEDIUM (July 12, 
everal states, including Michigan, California, Kentucky, and Nevada, are 
considering or have implemented legislation that moves . . . lower-level contests to coincide 
with the federal elections held in November of even-numbered years.
57 See Harvey J. Tucker, Low Voter Turnout and American Democracy 2 (Apr. 2004) (on 
Most special elections occur at 
unusual times and are the only contests on the ballot. Turnout is unusually low because 
contests are poorly publicized and potential voters receive little or no stimulus. see also
Marc Meredith, The Strategic Timing of Direct Democracy, 21 ECON. & POL. 159 (2009) 
(discussing the year-round scheduling of special school board elections). 
58 E.g., Briana Bierschbach, Special Election Results: Keeping the Status Quo at the 
Minnesota Capitol, MINN. POST (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.minnpost.com/politics-
policy/2018/02/special-election-results-keeping-status-quo-minnesota-capitol/ (noting that 
special elections for the Minnesota Legislature were held on Monday, February 12, 2018); 
Mitchell Schmidt, Robin Vos Requests Tony Evers Reschedule Special Election, Citing 
Jewish Holiday, WIS. ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2019), https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-
politics/robin-vos-requests-tony-evers-reschedule-special-election-citing-
jewish/article_c79696a6-7487-5141-b96f-e8eb927c967d.html (noting that the originally 
2020] 11
ust an 
interesting piece of political trivia it affects turnout59 and results. When 
special elections are held at unusual times of the year, as most are, it increases 
the potentiality for unexpected, inconsistent results. 60  Consider a few 
examples. In Georgia, Democrats won special elections for the state House in 
otherwise-conservative areas in 2015 and 2017,61 which they promptly lost in 
the next general election for each seat.62 Similarly, a Republican narrowly 
won a special state Senate election in a dark-blue area in 2015, but lost re-
election by a wide margin in 2016.63 Much more notably, Democrats won 
several heavily-Republican seats in the Oklahoma Legislature in 2017 special 
elections,64 but lost several of them in the regularly scheduled 2018 general 
election.65
While a handful of special elections serve more as anecdotes than 
meaningful data points, the basic principles at play are clear: Low-turnout 
district was Monday, December 30, 2019, the final day of Hanukkah). 
59 See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 57, at 2 (noting that special elections see low turnout). 
60 For example, in Minnesota, special elections for school funding projects, like special 
bonds, are statutorily mandated to occur at certain times of the year, unlike in Wisconsin, 
special elections for school bonds is higher than it is in Wisconsin. See Meredith, supra note 
53, at 71. 
61 See Maya Prabhu, Georgia Democrats Pick Up Three Legislative Seats in Special 
Elections, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-
govt--politics/georgia-democrats-pace-pick-three-legislative-seats-special-
elections/9KdkpqNX1CrVKyfal4qj7N/ (noting that Deborah Gonzalez and Jonathan 
Wallace won special elections to the Georgia House in 2017); Mark Woolsey, Taylor 
Bennett Wins District 80 Special Election Runoff, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Aug. 12, 2015), 
https://www.ajc.com/news/local/taylor-bennett-wins-district-special-election-
runoff/tKDtpotdsYMROfDX4sgmVN/ (noting that Taylor Bennett won a special election to 
the Georgia House in 2015). 
62 Sofi Gratas, Republicans Retake State House Districts 117, 119 After Just a Year of 
Democratic Control, RED & BLACK (Nov. 8, 2018), 
https://www.redandblack.com/athensnews/republicans-retake-state-house-districts-after-
just-a-year-of/article_cad9d68e-e314-11e8-99be-c7cf3c70b2a1.html (noting that Gonzalez 
and Wallace lost re-election in 2018); Ken Sugiura, Taylor Bennett Loses State House Race 
by Narrowest of Margins, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Nov. 9, 2016), 
https://www.ajc.com/sports/college/taylor-bennett-loses-state-house-race-narrowest-
margins/K08YNG2Iv24UguEQqu8MCL/ (noting that Bennett lost re-election in 2016). 
63 Mark Niesse, Anderson Unseats Van Ness for Georgia Senate, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Nov. 
8, 2016), https://www.ajc.com/news/local-govt--politics/anderson-unseats-van-ness-for-
georgia-senate/98r7ieq2x3fop7MONohaWO/. 
64 See, e.g., David Weigel, Democrats See Hope in Oklahoma Special Elections, WASH.
POST (July 12, 2017, 6:05 PM EDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
powerpost/wp/2017/07/12/democrats-see-hope-in-oklahoma-special-elections/. 
65 See, e.g., David Blatt, Oklahoma’s 2018 Elections Were Different in Many Ways, OKLA.
POL Y INST. (Nov. 15, 2018), https://okpolicy.org/oklahomas-2018-elections-were-
different-in-many-ways/. 
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elections are likely to be decided by the most intensely interested voters, who 
may not always reflect the electorate as a whole.66
the most recently scheduled general election which likelier had higher 
turnout than the special the district is effectively misrepresented in the 
legislature until it can correct the mistake at the next election. Legislative 
results of the previous general election remain in place until the next general 
election and they avoid control of the entire state government coming down 
to a single special election, as has happened too many times.67
Moreover, appointment systems are better than special elections at 
efficiently guaranteeing representation. When a legislative vacancy occurs in 
a state with special elections, it can take months to fill it
prior to the next election.68 If the vacancy occurs while the legislature is in 
journed
constituents during that time.69 This delay in scheduling special elections can 
be done vindictively or to score political points. For example, Republican 
Governors in Michigan and North Carolina delayed scheduling special 
congressional elections to fill safely Democratic seats to deprive House 
Democrats of two additional members.70 Governors in Missouri, New York, 
66 See SARAH F. ANZIA, TIMING AND TURNOUT: HOW OFF-CYCLE ELECTIONS FAVOR
ORGANIZED GROUPS 82 (2013). 
67 See, e.g., Ralph Jimenez, With Election Defeat, N.H. Democrats Lose Majority in Senate,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 9, 1999, at B19 (noting that a special election for the New Hampshire 
State Senate resulted in Democrats losing control of the chamber); See also Joseph 
With Manka Dhingra’s Washington State Senate Win, Democrats Plot 
Ambitious Course in Olympia, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 8, 2017), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/manka-dhingras-double-digit-lead-in-
45th-district-senate-race-sends-message-to-trump-gov-inslee-says/ (noting that a special 
election for the Washington State Senate resulted in Democrats gaining full control of the 
state government). 
68 In neighboring Virginia, for example, a special election can take months to schedule, if it 
ever happens at all. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.2-226, 24.2-228.1, 24.2-682 (2014). In 
Maryland, it can take up to 5 months to fill a congressional vacancy if a special election is 
called; see also MD. ELEC. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-710 (2020). 
69 E.g., Jim Turner, Vacant Seats Will Dot Florida Legislature During Session, ORLANDO 
WEEKLY (Dec. 30, 2017, 7:38 AM), 
https://www.orlandoweekly.com/Blogs/archives/2017/12/30/vacant-seats-will-dot-florida-
legislature-during-session More than 1.1 million Florida voters won t have a 
representative in one of the legislative chambers when the 2018 session begins next month. 
Resignations and a recent death have created six open seats, with most expected to remain 
vacant through the 60-day session because of scheduling requirements for special 
elections.
70 Gus Burns, Judge Orders State to Explain Why Election to Replace Conyers Won’t Be 
Sooner, MICH. (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/2018/03/
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and Wisconsin have engaged in similarly manipulative behavior when calling 
special elections to fill state legislative vacancies. New York Governor 
Andrew Cuomo held off on scheduling eleven special elections to the state 
legislature to avoid adding uncertainty into budget negotiations and to avoid 
upsetting the power-sharing arrangement between State Senate Republicans 
and Independent Democrats.71 Following an unexpected loss in a special 
election to the Wisconsin State Senate in 2018, which narrowed the 
Republican majority in that chamber, then-Governor Scott Walker announced 
72
only relenting when ordered to do so by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.73
And Missouri Governor Mike Parson appointed two Democratic State 
Senators to his administration, triggering vacancies in the State Senate, which 
he announced that he would not fill perhaps to further reduce the 
Democratic minority.74
This sort of gamesmanship can work in the opposite direction, too, 
where governors deliberately schedule special elections months or weeks 
before general elections. This sort of decision wastes millions of dollars, 
burdens county election offices, and increases voter fatigue so why do it? 
The most compelling answer is partisan gain. When U.S. Senator Frank 
Lautenberg, a Democrat from New Jersey, died in 2013, Governor Chris 
Christie was required to schedule a special election to replace him. Despite 
the fact that the state was having its regularly scheduled gubernatorial election 
in November 2013, Christie scheduled the election for October, incurring 
nearly $24 million in election administration costs.75 Democrats alleged that 
Christie, who was running for re-election and was favored to win, wanted to 
lawsuit_says_gov_snyder_is_del.html; Jim Morrill, Mel Watt’s Seat in Congress to Sit 
Empty Until November, NEWS & OBSERVER (Jan. 6, 2014, 5:08 PM), 
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/politics-columns-blogs/under-
the-dome/article10289234.html. 
71 Bill Mahoney, More Legislative Vacancies: Nothing Special for Cuomo, POLITICO N.Y. 
(Feb. 16, 2017, 5:22 EST), https://www.politico.com/states/new-
york/albany/story/2017/02/the-past-is-no-guide-for-cuomo-and-special-elections-109655; 
John Nichols, Republicans Have an Ingenious Plan to Stop Losing Special Elections, THE 
NATION (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/republicans-have-an-
ingenious-plan-to-stop-losing-special-elections/. 
72 Id. 
73 Shawn Johnson, Walker Won’t Ask Wisconsin Supreme Court to Block Special Elections 
Order, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Mar. 28, 2018, 3:40 PM), https://www.wpr.org/walker-wont-ask-
wisconsin-supreme-court-block-special-elections-order.
74 See Jason Hancock, Group Vows Lawsuit if Gov. Parson Won’t Call Special Election for 
KC Senate Seats, KANSAS CITY STAR (Jan. 21, 2020, 3:56 PM), 
https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article239493293.html. 
75 Emily Schultheis & Maggie Haberman, Christie Slammed for Special Election, POLITICO
(June 4, 2013, 2:09 EDT), https://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/chris-christie-frank-
lautenberg-special-election-092211. 
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avoid sharing the ballot with then-Newark Mayor Cory Booker, which would 
gin up Democratic turnout and imperil his re-election.76
Similarly, in 2018, Texas Governor Greg Abbott opted to schedule a 
special election for the Texas State Senate for late July rather than on the 
regularly scheduled Election Day in November. 77  When no candidate 
received a majority, Abbott scheduled the runoff election for September 18
less than two months before the general election.78 The result was a surprise 
Texas Senate until 2021, when the seat was next scheduled to be up.79
This sort of gamesmanship both in declining to schedule special 
elections at all and in scheduling them for inconvenient times could be 
remedied with constitutional amendments or laws that require the calling of 
special elections within a certain period of time and that require consolidation 
with regularly scheduled general elections. 80  But most states (and the 
Constitution) lack these sort of procedures and protections, instead granting 
their governors standardless discretion for scheduling elections.81 And in any 
event, temporary legislative appointments followed by special elections 
scheduled for the next general election solve almost all of those problems. 
76 Id. 
77 Patrick Svitek, Gov. Greg Abbott Announces July 31 Special Election for State Sen. 
Carlos Uresti’s Seat, TEX. TRIB. (June 20, 2018), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2018/06/20/abbott-announces-july-31-special-election-uresti-
seat/. 
78 Patrick Svitek, Abbott Sets Runoff to Replace State Sen. Carlos Uresti for Sept. 18, TEX.
TRIB. (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/08/13/gov-greg-abbott-sets-sd-
19-runoff-sept-18-lawyers-say/. 
79 Patrick Svitek, Republican Pete Flores Upsets Democrat Pete Gallego in Race for Uresti 
Seat, TEX. TRIB. (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/09/18/republican-
pete-flores-track-upset-race-democratic-friendly-uresti-sea/. 
80 The State of Washington, for example, automatically schedules special elections for the 
next regularly scheduled general election, which is in November of each year. See generally
WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.04.321 (2015). 
81 See, e.g., Rhodes v. Snyder, 302 F. Supp. 3d 905, 909-
statute provides broad discretion to the governor. It does not contain any particular 
ca
general election is held at least thirty days after the vacancy occurs MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 168.633);
Constitution] provides that the Governor must call for a special election, but that the timing 
of that election is up to the Governor and the state to decide. Although there may be cases in 
which such an extraordinary amount of time passes from the existence of the vacancy to the 
issuance of the proclamation that it amounts to a de facto refusal to call a special election at 
all, that is not the situation before me. The winner of the November 2 special election will 
presumably take office almost immediately after that date, and although plaintiffs might 
prefer that to occur sooner, I do not believe that the delay here is so long as to amount to a 
constitutional violation.
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III. HOW TO REFORM MARYLAND S SYSTEM
better than a special-election system would all Marylanders are fully 
represented during legislative sessions; the state avoids the inconvenience and 
cost of special elections; and the ideological differences between appointed 
and elected legislators are likely minimal. 
system is unlike most others in the country in terms of the absolute power 
given to local party committees, the lack of practical oversight by any elected 
official, and the permanency of the appointment. These characteristics make 
the current system sometimes veer concerningly close to the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century system that the state abolished in 1837 and are worthy of 
change. Several pragmatic solutions, some of which mirror what already 
works in other states, would satisfactorily improve these failings and create 
an even more representative system. 
current constitution, party committees have 
virtually unchecked and absolute power. For all practical purposes, they are 
the ones making appointments to fill legislative vacancies. Though, as 
mentioned previously, the constitution is ambiguous as to whether the 
governor is required 82 that 
appears to be the agreed-
it inappropriately consolidates power in an unelected and unaccountable 
organization. Party committees having some say in same-party legislative 
most states grant them at least some 
power but absolute control is rare. 
without granting them total
be concentrated in the party committee members themselves. Some states, 
like Kansas and Wyoming, instead require that a district-wide convention, 
replacement.83 Moving to this sort of system, while depriving voters in the 
legislative district of representation for a short period of time, would introduce 
more democratic accountability to the process and would make the process 
more public and transparent.84
82 See supra text accompanying notes 34-39.
83 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-3902 (2020); WYO. STAT. § 22-18-111(iii)(A) (2020). Though 
see § 25-
see § 22-18-111(iii)(A). Nonetheless, the procedure is essentially the same. 
84 Cf. Shen, supra note 5. 
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 Second, regardless of which division of the party has the power to 
political actor. Under Maryl
nominee; it picks a designee. In so doing
name and sends the governor more than one name85
virtually unreviewable. Very few other states have such a party-focused 
system, 86  and most grant the formal and practical selection power to an 
elected actor. Some states allow the governor to make the final selection from 
a small group of nominees,87 while others allow the county commissions 
where the district was located to make the final selection.88
 Maryland should implement a similar system. It makes little sense to 
grant the governor an effectively illusory power namely, to make an 
appointment if he has no practical power. Moreover, adding another layer 
of review to the established procedure can help prevent abuses and insider-
driven selection processes. Under the current system, if a party committee 
selected a candidate to fill a vacancy who was otherwise-constitutionally 
eligible to serve in the general assembly, but was corrupt, or had repeatedly 
unpalatable views, it is unclear what recourse anyone, much less a dissatisfied 
voter in the district, would have. But if another step were added to the process, 
dissatisfied voters could appeal to the governor or county commission to 
reject the nominee.89
 Third, Maryland should provide for a system that combines legislative 
appointments and special elections by providing that an appointee only serves 
until the next regularly scheduled general election. Such a system pulls the 
best of both systems immediate, effective representation and popular 
85 See supra text accompanying notes 38-39. 
86 MD. CONST. art. III, § 13; N. MAR. I. CONST. art. II, § 9; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-3902 
(2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-11 (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20A-1-503 (2020); V.I.
CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 111 (2020). 
87 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-3, 17-4 (2020); IDAHO CODE § 59-904A (2020); W. VA.
CODE § 3-10-5 
appointment power but if the legislative district encompasses more than one county, then 
each county commission nominates a replacement to the governor, who makes the final 
selection. However, this is not a same-party appointment system. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
2-7C-5, 2-8D-4 (2020). 
88 WASH. CONST. art. II, § 15; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1202 (2020); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 5-2-402 (2020); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 171.060 (2020); WYO. STAT. § 22-18-111(a)(iii) 
(2020). 
89 On a practical level, it likely makes the most sense to add county commissions, not the 
governor, to this process. County commissions are closer to the voters and are more likely 
county commission in western Maryland or 
on the Eastern Shore, for example
governors or have power in state government is likelier to be attuned to the conservative 
views of districts in their communities than the governor of an otherwise-liberal state. 
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input while pulling from the worst of neither. One of the biggest complaints 
rrent system has been the permanency of the 
appointments. If a vacancy occurs, say, a day after a legislator is sworn into 
her four-year term, her replacement will serve the remainder of the term. By 
that point, any antipathy toward the process used to appoint the replacement 
legislator may well have dissipated, and by that point, the replacement will 
have all of the benefits of incumbency. It is likely for that reason that most 
states with legislative appointments make them temporary the replacement 
only serves until the next general election, unless the vacancy occurs too close 
to then.90
 Though the permanency of the appointment has some appeal to it
Maryland is one of only two states to elect its legislators to four-year terms,91
so consolidating all legislative elections on the same day may be defensible
it effectively neuters one of the most compelling justifications for same-party 
legislative appointments. The principle behind these sorts of appointments is 
ent general election should be 
respected.92
at the next general election, regardless of whether the legislative seat would 
ordinarily be up for election, is simply illogical. If nothing else
case, voter turnout is usually higher in presidential elections, 93  when no
legislators are elected, 94  so it makes more sense to have legislative 
90 NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 12; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 4, para. 1; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 15; 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-12-203 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-3, 17-4 (2020); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 5-2-406 (2020); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-7C-5, 2-8D-4 (2020); UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 20A-1-503(3) (2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111(a) (2020); see Nev. Op. 
-84 (1955). Maryland is one of only four states or territories the
others being Indiana, Kansas, and Puerto Rico
supra 24 note at 31. 
91 Number of Legislators and Length of Terms in Years, NAT L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/number-of-legislators-
and-length-of-terms.aspx (last accessed Jan. 27, 2020). 
92 Supra PART II. 
93 Turnout is generally higher in presidential elections than midterm elections. See generally 
Robert A. Jackson, Differential Influences on Participation in Midterm Versus Presidential 
Elections,37 SOC. SCI. J. 385 (2000). This is true for Maryland as well. Compare, e.g., 
Official Turnout (By Part and County), Election: 2016 Presidential General Election, MD. 
ST. BD. OF ELECTIONS, https://elections.maryland.gov/elections/2016/turnout/ 
general/Official%20by%20Party%20and%20County.pdf (statewide turnout for the 2016 
election was 71.98%) (last accessed Jan. 27, 2020), with Official Turnout (By Part and 
County), Election: 2018 Gubernatorial General Election, MD. ST. BD. OF ELECTIONS, 
https://elections.maryland.gov/elections/2018/turnout/general/Official%20by%20Party%20
and%20County.pdf (statewide turnout for the 2018 election was 59.06%). (last accessed 
Jan. 27, 2020). 
94 MD. CONST.
Tuesday next, after the first Monday in the month of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-
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appointments expire in presidential-
election.  
Indeed, this third recommendation is the same proposal crystallized in 
same time as the regular statewide primary election and the regular statewide 
95
it does not alter the 
meaningful confirmation or appointment power to any other political actor. 
Piecemeal approaches are understandable in other contexts, but given the 
difficulty of amending the state constitution,96 it makes substantially less 
sense here. While public attention is focused on the issue, the general 
assembly should use this opportunity to go big and enact meaningful 
structural change to the appointment process. 
CONCLUSION
way from an inherently undemocratic system that stifled public 
accountability over the State Senate to a system that seeks to balance both the 
desires of the electorate and the need for efficient, accurate representation. 
 approach needs 
rebalancing. Maryland can borrow what works from other states spreading 
out the power currently held by the party committees in an absolute 
monopoly, adding a meaningful step of review to the appointment process, 
and making appointments temporary and breathe democratic life into a 
system that has largely remained unaltered since its adoption in 1936. 
95 H.B. 103, 2019 Leg., 438th Sess. (Md. 2019). 
96 See generally MD. CONST. art. XIV, § 1 (noting that the Maryland Constitution requires 
a three-fifths majority vote in both houses of the assembly and approval from the 
electorate).
